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Data mining information about people is becoming increasingly important in the data-driven society of the
21st century. Unfortunately, sometimes there are real-world considerations that conflict with the goals of
data mining; sometimes the privacy of the people being data mined needs to be considered. This necessitates
that the output of data mining algorithms be modified to preserve privacy while simultaneously not ruining
the predictive power of the outputtedmodel. Differential privacy is a strong, enforceable definition of privacy
that can be used in data mining algorithms, guaranteeing that nothing will be learned about the people in
the data that could not already be discovered without their participation. In this survey, we focus on one
particular data mining algorithm – decision trees – and how differential privacy interacts with each of the
components that constitute decision tree algorithms. We analyze both greedy and random decision trees,
and the conflicts that arise when trying to balance privacy requirements with the accuracy of the model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Gathering and analyzing information about people is becoming increasingly impor-
tant in the data-driven society of the 21st century. Technology continues to facilitate
new and efficient ways of collecting data, but extracting knowledge from the data re-
mains a difficult and nuanced topic. Many fields of science intersect when “mining”
data for information; machine learning, statistics and database systems all play a
role in producing useful information from (potentially enormous) repositories of data
[Breiman 2001b]. The intersection of these fields is often referred to as “data min-
ing”, and data mining algorithms cover a wide range of applications; some output
humanly-understandable patterns discovered in the data [Vellido et al. 2012], some
produce a classification or regressionmodel that can make predictions about the future
[Criminisi et al. 2011], and others detect anomalies in the data [Chandola et al. 2009].
In this survey, we focus on one particular kind of classification model: decision trees
[Quinlan 1986]. We introduce decision trees in detail in Section 2.2.
Unfortunately, sometimes there are real-world considerations that conflict with
the goals of data mining; sometimes the privacy of the people being data mined
needs to be considered. Privacy plays a role in scenarios ranging from government
projects like a census, to businesses collecting information about their present and
future customers, to health organizations analyzing illnesses or hospitals admissions
[Mohammed et al. 2015]. In some of these cases, the government may mandate cer-
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tain privacy protections; in other cases, businesses may want to encourage customers
to provide more personal data by promising to protect their privacy. These privacy
considerations necessitate that the original data be modified in some way, or that the
output of data mining algorithms be modified, while hopefully not ruining the infor-
mation that can be discovered from the data [Brankovic and Estivill-Castro 1999].
Many strategies for protecting privacy have been explored in recent years
[Adam and Worthmann 1989; Aggarwal and Yu 2008; Fung et al. 2010]. Noise
addition [Agrawal and Srikant 2000; Islam and Brankovic 2011], k-anonymity
[Sweeney 2002] and l-diversity [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007] are several such
strategies, however these strategies provide privacy in a way that is not “guarantee-
able”; that is, they do not provide privacy in a mathematically rigorous way that
guarantees that every person with sensitive information in a dataset will have their
privacy protected. A recent example of this phenomena was seen in Australia, were
the government released a health dataset describing one billion insurance claims
since 1984 to researchers. The privacy of the people in the dataset was protected using
“a suite of confidentiality measures including encryption, perturbation and exclusion
of rare events” [Cowan 2016a]. This approach received wide criticism for not being
rigorous enough, including from Australia’s Privacy Commissioner, Timothy Pilgrim
[Cowan 2016b].
Differential privacy, proposed in 2006, is a privacy-preserving strategy that recti-
fies the weaknesses of other strategies by guaranteeing that nothing can be learned
about any individual in the dataset, that could not have been learned even if the in-
dividual was not in the dataset at all [Dwork 2006; Dwork and Roth 2013]. It is this
definition of privacy preservation that we focus on in this survey, and we introduce
differential privacy in more detail in Section 2.1. Differential privacy has become the
de-facto privacy standard around the world in recent years, with the U.S. Census Bu-
reau using it in their Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program in 2008
[Machanavajjhala et al. 2008], and the technology company Apple implementing dif-
ferential privacy in their latest operating systems and applications [Greenberg 2016].
Several previous works have surveyed the conflict between data mining and differ-
ential privacy [Ji et al. 2014; Sarwate and Chaudhuri 2013]. What separates our work
from theirs is that ours focuses on decision trees in particular, going into greater depth
on the intricacies of differentially-private decision tree algorithms than is possible in
a more general survey. Sarwate and Chaudhuri [2013] provided a general overview of
machine learning with differential privacy, briefly discussing classification, regression,
dimensionality reduction, time series, filtering, and a suite of some of the basic “build-
ing blocks” of differential privacy, such as the differences between input, output and
objective perturbation, the Exponential mechanism, and robust differentially-private
statistics. Ji et al. [2014] focused more on specific differentially-private data mining
algorithms, providing an overview of the work done with naive Bayes models, linear
regression, linear SVM’s, logistic regression, kernel SVM’s, decision trees, online con-
vex programming, k-means, feature selection, PCA, and statistical estimators. Aside
from the above two surveys, Yang et al. [2012] provide some additional resources and
references in their short workshop paper. To the best of our knowledge, these are the
only surveys that previously explored the intersection between data mining and dif-
ferential privacy.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a definition that makes a promise to each individual who has
personal data in a dataset: “You will not be affected, adversely or otherwise, by al-
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Fig. 1. High-level representation of the user’s interface with private data, using differential privacy (DP).
lowing your data to be used in any analysis of the data, no matter what other anal-
yses, datasets, or information sources are available” [Dwork and Roth 2013]. It does
not promise that nothing will be discovered about the individual, just that whatever
is discovered about them would have been discovered even if their data was not in the
dataset at all. It also promises that any supplementary data a malicious user might
have about the individual is irrelevant; the attacker can know any amount of informa-
tion about an individual, and even know every single other data point in the dataset,
and still not be able to detect the presence of the targeted individual. This is not a
100% guarantee, but instead a very high probability guarantee. The exact probability
is determined by a parameter ǫ, which is chosen by the data owner. The smaller ǫ is,
the higher the privacy guarantee.
Figure 1 presents a high-level view of the pipeline used by differentially-private data
mining algorithms; an algorithm submits a query to the dataset, the dataset calculates
the answer to the query, and then a differentially-private mechanism modifies the
answer in a way that protects the privacy of every individual person in the dataset.
We briefly define differential privacy, and some differentially-private mechanisms
that decision trees can take advantage of. An in-depth description of the many facets
of differential privacy is provided by Dwork and Roth [2013]. We write the following
definitions in terms of some query (i.e., function) f submitted to a dataset x describing
n records (i.e., individuals) from a universe D. We compare x to a neighboring dataset
y, where “neighbor” describes how many records differ between x and y (i.e., their
Hamming distance in terms of records).
THEOREM 2.1 (DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY [DWORK 2006]). A non-deterministic
function M (i.e. a function with a randomized component) is ǫ-differentially private if
for all outputs g ⊆ Range(M) and for all data x, y ∈ Dn such that ||x− y||1 ≤ 1:
Pr(M(x) = g) ≤ eǫ × Pr(M(y) = g) . (1)
FunctionM will often be “wrapper” function around a deterministic function f .
The parameter ǫ can be considered as a “cost”, with multiple costs summing together,
described below:
THEOREM 2.2 (COMPOSITION [MCSHERRY AND TALWAR 2007]). The application
of all functions {Mi(x)}, each satisfying ǫi-differential privacy, satisfies
∑
i
ǫi-differential
privacy.
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If the same query (i.e. function) is submitted to multiple subsets of the data, with no
overlapping records, the costs do not need to be summed:
THEOREM 2.3 (PARALLEL COMPOSITION [MCSHERRY 2009]). For disjoint sub-
sets xi ⊂ x, let functionM(xi) satisfy ǫ-differential privacy; then applying all functions
{M(xi)} still satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
Differential privacy is a definition, not an algorithm; mechanisms need to be de-
signed that allow a user to query data in a way that adheres to the definition. These
mechanisms are often formulated as function M , which takes a non-private function
f as input and converts it into a differentially-private function. A popular mechanism
for outputting a real number is to use the following Laplace mechanism, and a discrete
value can be outputted with the Exponential mechanism:
THEOREM 2.4 (LAPLACE MECHANISM [DWORK ET AL. 2006]). A query M satis-
fies ǫ-differential privacy if it outputs M(x) = f(x) + L, where f : f(x) → R and
L ∼ Lap(∆(f)/ǫ) is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from the Laplace distribution
with mean 0 and scale ∆(f)/ǫ. We shorten L ∼ Lap(∆(f)/ǫ) to Lap(∆(f)/ǫ) when our
meaning is clear from context. ∆ is described below.
THEOREM 2.5 (EXPONENTIAL MECHANISM [MCSHERRY AND TALWAR 2007]).
Using a scoring function u : u(z, x)→ R where u has a higher value for more preferable
outputs z ∈ Z, a query M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if it outputs z with probability
proportional to exp ( ǫu(z,x)2∆(u) ). That is,
Pr(M(x) = z) ∝ exp
(
ǫ× u(z, x)
2∆(u)
)
. (2)
The above mechanisms add noise to the output that is scaled to the “sensitivity”
∆ of the query, which is defined as the maximum amount that the output could
change by if x had one record added or removed. Other definitions of sensitivity ex-
ist [Nissim et al. 2007], but for now we limit the discussion to global sensitivity:
THEOREM 2.6 (GLOBAL SENSITIVITY [DWORK ET AL. 2006]). A query f has
global sensitivity ∆(f), where:
∆(f) = max
x,y:||x−y||1≤1
||f(x)− f(y)||1 . (3)
2.1.1. Factors that Affect Differentially-Private Algorithms. The main factors that need to be
considered when designing a data mining algorithm are:
—How large of a privacy budget β the data owner is providing the user with. The total
budget dictates the overall constraints put on the data mining algorithm. We discuss
the range of sizes β can have in real-world scenarios in Section 7.
—The number of times the data needs to be queried. The more queries that the algo-
rithm needs, the more the total privacy budget needs to be divided up to pay for them
all. If each query uses ǫi amount of the budget,
∑
i ǫi ≤ β. The smaller ǫi is, the more
noisy the outputs of the queries will be. Limiting the number of required queries is
discussed in Section 3.2, Section 3.4 and Section 3.8.
—The sensitivity ∆ of the queries. Sometimes a query that performs well in a non-
private setting becomes unusable due to how sensitive it is to individual records,
leading to overwhelming noise being added to the output. Instead, traditionally sub-
optimal queries in non-private settings can be preferable in the private setting if they
have low sensitivity. We explore this phenomena in Section 3.2.
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—The size n of dataset x also plays an important role. The amount of noise that must
be added to enforce differential privacy is independent of n, so the larger n is, the
smaller the relative amount of noise becomes.
2.2. Conventional, Non-private Decision Trees
Decision trees are a non-parametric supervised learning method used for classification
[Han et al. 2006]. They make no assumptions about the distribution of the underlying
data, and are trained on labeled data to correctly classify previously unseen data. They
have several advantages over other kinds of supervised learning methods that make
them appealing to data scientists. Some advantages include their:
—high human interpretability [Huysmans et al. 2011; Letham et al. 2013]
—non-parametric design [Murphy 2012]
— relatively low computational cost [Han et al. 2006]
—ability to discover non-linear relationships among the attributes [Han et al. 2006]
— resilience to missing values [Quinlan 1993]
—ability to handle both continuous and discrete data [Quinlan 1996]
—ability to handle non-binary labels [Quinlan 1996]
Their main disadvantages – tendency to over-fit the data and instability to small
changes in the data – are minimized by limiting how deep the trees can grow, prun-
ing away untrustworthy leaf nodes, building an ensemble of trees instead of just one,
and using bootstrapped data samples in each tree [Breiman 2001a]. Other disadvan-
tages can make them unsuitable in some scenarios, such their difficulty in finding
non-orthogonal decision boundaries or express XOR relationships [Murphy 2012]. De-
spite some disadvantages, their advantages make them an apt choice in a wide variety
of data mining scenarios.
The “untrustworthiness” of a node can be defined in a variety of ways
[Letham et al. 2013], but the most common methods involve “support” and “confi-
dence”. Support refers to the size of the data subset (i.e., the number of records) in
the node. Confidence refers to the homogeneity of the class labels in the node; that
is, the percentage of records with the most common class label in the node. For most
intents and purposes, the class is the same as any other attribute of the dataset, ex-
cept that it has been specially chosen to act as a way of classifying records. The class
C has multiple possible values c ∈ C, often called “labels”, with each record having
one or more labels. The larger the support and confidence, the more a node is nor-
mally trusted. Tangentially, a node’s “interestingness” is another active field of re-
search, which aims to describe how much useful information is contained in a node
[Geng and Hamilton 2006; Guillet and Hamilton 2007].
Fig. 2 is an example of a decision tree. Put briefly, a decision tree is an acyclic directed
graph, built using top-down recursive partitioning of the dataset [Han et al. 2006]. The
records in the dataset are recursively divided into subsets using “tests” in each node
of the tree. The test checks the value each record has for a chosen attribute, sending
records to the child node that matches the value they have. An attribute is chosen
in each node based on that attribute’s ability to split records into subsets that have
as homogeneous a class label as possible. For continuous attributes, the best splitting
value is found, splitting the records into two child nodes based on whether records’
value is higher or lower than the splitting value. For discrete attributes, either a child
node is created for every value, or a single value is chosen to split the records based on
having that value or not having that value.
Once the tree has recursively divided the data the maximum number of times (i.e.,
reached the maximum tree depth) or the nodes do not have enough records to reli-
ably classify records outside the training data (i.e., over-fitting becomes likely), tree-
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Fig. 2. An example of a decision tree, with a depth of d = 3.
building is stopped. The resulting tree can then undergo a small amount of back-
propagation in the form of “pruning”, where untrustworthy leaf nodes are removed
from the bottom of the tree [Han et al. 2006]. The tree is then ready for classifying,
whereby unseen records can be filtered through the tree based on the tests in each
node, finally ending up in the only leaf node for which it obeys all the preceding tests.
The majority (i.e., most common) class label out of the training records in that leaf
node is then the predicted class label of the new record. The path a record took from
the root node to a leaf node is sometimes called the root-to-leaf path, or the “rule” that
the record obeys [Menardi and Torelli 2014]. Each root-to-leaf path in a decision tree
is a different rule, and the set of rules can be considered a summary of the information
conveyed by the dataset.
If the tree is built greedily (explained in Section 2.2.1), local optima are a possibility,
which could lead to parts of the tree being of much lower quality than other parts of
the tree. Small fluctuations in the training data can also cause different attributes
to be chosen in early nodes, cascading into a completely different tree structure from
what otherwise might be built. To avoid these problems, a forest (i.e., an ensemble or
collection) of trees is built, with unseen records being filtered through every tree, and
the most common prediction out of all the trees being used as the final predicted class
label (a process commonly referred to as “voting” [Han et al. 2006]).
Within this basic tree-building process, there are two fundamentally different ap-
proaches that can be taken: greedy approaches and random approaches. We briefly
discuss the differences below. For a more thorough explanation of decision trees, we
refer the reader to Han et al. [2006].
2.2.1. Greedy Decision Trees. The process of top-down decision-making is sometimes
referred to as “greedy” decision-making, due to its strategy of making the optimal
decision for the immediate short-term situation, with no regard for long-term con-
sequences. While clearly not perfect, considering all possible eventualities of a system
is usually NP-hard, and greedy heuristics perform well in practice [Han et al. 2006].
Greedy decision trees use this heuristic strategy, where an objective function is max-
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imized in each node of the tree to decide how to split the node into child nodes.
Many different splitting functions have been proposed for decision trees in the past,
such as information gain [Quinlan 1993], gain ratio [Quinlan 1996], and gini index
[Breiman et al. 1984], and they all aim to maximize the discriminatory power of the
child nodes in as unbiased [Quinlan 1996] a way as possible. We briefly describe one
such splitting function, information gain, as an example below:
Information Gain. Informally, information gain uses Shannon’s definition of infor-
mation as being the opposite of entropy [Shannon 1949]; reducing entropy means gain-
ing information. More formally, information gain can be expressed as the entropy of the
current node i minus the total entropy of the child nodes J created by splitting i with
each value of an attribute A. Since the aim is to find the attribute that best reduces
entropy, and the entropy of i is the same regardless of which attribute is selected to
make child nodes J , only the entropy of J needs to be calculated in order to find the
attribute with the largest information gain. The attribute that will best split i is the
attribute that minimizes:
InfoGain(xi, A) = −
∑
v∈A
(
nvi
ni
∑
c∈C
nv,ci
nvi
log2
nv,ci
nvi
)
, (4)
where xi is the subset of x in node i, n
v
i is the number of records in i with value v ∈ A,
and similarly for nv,ci with class label c ∈ C.
Examples of greedy decision tree algorithms are ID3 [Quinlan 1986] (which was de-
veloped further into C4.5 [Quinlan 1993]) and CART [Breiman et al. 1984]. These al-
gorithms built a single tree, and were extended in later years to build an ensemble of
trees. Random Forest [Breiman 2001a] is one such extension, which selects a random
subset of records and a random subset of attributes to build each decision tree with, of-
ten 100 or more times. The random selection of records and attributes adds diversity to
the decision trees, helping prevent the greedy splitting function from getting trapped
in local optima. It also prevents the final decision forest from being over-reliant on
specific records, which can otherwise lead to fragile tree structures.
2.2.2. Random Decision Trees. Breiman [2001a] took advantage of randomness (hence
the name, “Random Forest”) to improve the performance of decision trees. This
idea has since been taken much further by removing greedy heuristics all-together
[Fan et al. 2003; Geurts et al. 2006]. For these random decision trees, nodes are in-
stead split by randomly selecting an attribute. In the case of continuous attributes,
the splitting point can also be uniformly randomly selected from the attribute’s range.
This approach works extremely poorly for a single tree; it only performs well when
many random trees are used in combination. The computational cost of this approach
is also much lower than an ensemble of greedy decision trees, since it avoids calcu-
lating the output of an objective function for every attribute in every node of every
tree.
2.2.3. Factors that Affect Tree Classification. The main factors to consider when designing
a decision tree algorithm are:
—What kinds of dataset properties the algorithm is catered towards, such as if it can
handle discrete attributes, continuous attributes, or both. The dimensionality of the
dataset also plays a large role, mostly in terms of how the number of attributes m
affects tree depth, discussed in Section 3.4. The number of records n also plays a
role in defining termination criteria, but predominately due to the requirements of
differential privacy, as mentioned in Section 2.1.1. The overall role of the data is
discussed in Section 3.1.
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—What splitting function to use (including random selection). We explore the effect of
this decision in Section 3.2.
—What termination criteria to use. We discuss four different types of terminations, and
several examples of each, in Section 3.4.
—Whether to include a pruning step, and what pruning would be most appropriate if
so. We discuss pruning in Section 3.5.
—Whether to build multiple trees and use each as part of a larger ensemble, and how
many trees to build if so. We explore these ideas in Section 3.6.
3. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE DECISION TREE CLASSIFICATION
When outputting a decision tree, privacy is leaked via the information describing each
node. At its most basic level a decision tree algorithm is deciding which attribute to
split each node with (e.g. with a splitting function; see Equation 4), and this decision
is dictated by the data in the node. Once the tree has finished being built, the leaf
nodes can output some information about the class counts, which is also dictated by
the data in the nodes (see Section 2.2). Since these decisions and outputs are directly
based on the data, differential privacy states that releasing the information can be a
breach of privacy. These potential breaches are what a differentially-private decision
tree algorithm aims to prevent.
3.1. When is the data needed?
Part of the privacy budget β needs to be spent whenever the private data is queried.
This means it is important to identify when exactly the data needs to be queried in
order to build a decision tree. The less times the data needs to be queried, the less
budget we need to spend, or the more budget we can spend per query. Sometimes the
data will not necessarily need to be queried, but doing so will still be worth the privacy
cost due to how much better the classifier performs because of it. Spending part of the
budget on optional queries is explored in Section 3.8.
Which queries should be considered “compulsory” depends on one major character-
istic of the tree-building algorithm: whether it builds the tree greedily or randomly. By
“greedily”, we refer to an algorithm using an objective function locally in each node;
heuristically finding the best attribute to divide the local subset of data contained in a
node (see Section 2.2.1). No matter what objective function is used (be it information
gain, gini index, or any other), it requires querying the local data at least once. We
refer to these as “non-leaf queries”, since they are performed in each non-leaf node in a
tree, and explore them in detail in Section 3.2. The other compulsory query for greedy
trees is the same as the only compulsory query for random trees. By “random” we re-
fer to algorithms that do not use an objective function in each node, and instead pick
attributes randomly (thus having no need for the data; see Section 2.2.2). The com-
pulsory query that both categories of decision trees share is a query that enables the
prediction of class labels for unseen, unlabeled data. In almost all cases, this takes the
form of querying the distribution of class counts in each leaf node, with the most com-
mon (i.e., majority) class label being used as the predicted label for future records (see
Section 2.2). We refer to these queries as “leaf queries” and discuss them in Section 3.3.
It is worth mentioning that in almost all scenarios involving differential privacy,
the attribute schema (that is, the domains of the attributes) is considered to be pub-
lic knowledge [Blum et al. 2005; Dwork and Roth 2013; Friedman and Schuster 2010;
Jagannathan et al. 2012; Rana et al. 2016]. This information can be dependent on the
data in the sense that the domain of a discrete attribute is the set of discrete values in
the dataset x, but it can also contain values that are possible in the universeD but lack
any actual examples in x. This is the recommended approach for continuous attributes
[Dwork and Roth 2013]; defining the lower and upper bounds of a continuous attribute
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using the minimum and maximum values found in x can be a breach of privacy, and so
instead it is better to define the bounds using the universeD. For example in Figure 2,
the domain of the “Age” attribute might be [0, 120], even if the oldest person in x is 96.
This approach can be used for discrete attributes as well, though defining the domain
of an attribute like “City” as all possible cities on Earth is likely to make the attribute
untenable when trying to query it. It is therefore the responsibility of the data owner
to provide a reasonable attribute schema to the users wishing to query the data. It is
possible for users to use their best estimations to create a reasonable schema of their
own, but this is susceptible to practical issues such as value formatting and spelling.
Without a public attribute schema, it is difficult to imagine how queries can even be
submitted to a database, and thus this information is considered to be known by the
user within the scope covered by this survey.
3.2. Non-leaf Queries
Deciding which attribute to split a node with to optimize its ability to discrimi-
nate between class labels is at the core of a greedy decision tree algorithm. It is
what Blum et al. [2005] focused on during differential privacy’s inception in 2005,
where they proposed a simple proof-of-concept decision tree algorithm. This algorithm
demonstrated how a traditional non-private algorithm could be converted to achieve
differential privacy, by rephrasing the splitting function in terms of queries that could
be made differentially-private. Specifically, Blum et al. [2005] made Information Gain
(see Equation 4) differentially-private by breaking it down into two counting queries
for each attribute A, and then making the counting queries differentially-private with
the Laplace mechanism (Section 2.1):
Blum et al.’s Query 1. nv,ci + Lap(1/ǫ); ∀c ∈ C, ∀v ∈ A and
Blum et al.’s Query 2. nvi + Lap(1/ǫ); ∀v ∈ A.
where ni is the number of records (i.e., support) in node i, n
v
i (and n
v,c
i ) is the num-
ber of records in i with value v (and class label c), and ǫ is the privacy budget spent
on that query. With these two queries, Equation 4 can then be calculated client-
side. Differentially-private outputs are immune to post-processing privacy breaches,
so nothing more needs to be done to satisfy differential privacy in the non-leaf nodes.
It is, however, a costly approach to take when considering the privacy budget. If
we consider the user’s total privacy budget to be β, then the two queries listed above
can only receive a small fraction of β each. When querying any given attribute A with
the above queries, the counts for each combination of value v and label c involves a
disjoint subset of xi (i.e., the data in node i), allowingQuery 1 to be composed in parallel
∀c ∈ C, ∀v ∈ A (Theorem 2.3). Query 2 uses the same data as the first query though,
and so its privacy cost is summed with the cost of the first query (Theorem 2.2). This
then needs to be repeated for every attribute A, at every level of the tree (sibling nodes
contain disjoint subsets of x and can be composed in parallel). When all is said and
done, each query in the algorithm has a fraction of the total privacy budget β equal to:
ǫ =
β
2md
,
where m is the number of attributes and d is the tree depth (including the root and
leaf levels)1. This expenditure of the budget is inefficient for several reasons. One in-
efficiency can be immediately seen when looking at the two queries listed above; the
second query could be calculated by simply summing the outputs from the first query!
1Note that strictly speaking, the leaf nodes only require one query; the total class counts in each leaf node.
We discuss leaf queries in Section 3.3
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That is, nvi =
∑
c∈C n
v,c
i , allowing the user to skip the second query entirely. This would
involve summing the Lap(1/ǫ) noise added to each nv,ci count, but this actually results
in lower noise due to a lot of the noise “canceling out” [Fletcher and Islam 2015b].
We explore the idea of summed noise canceling itself out in Section 3.5, and further
budget-saving strategies in Section 3.8.
Converting a splitting function into differentially-private counting queries is fortu-
nately not the only approach one can take when building a greedy tree. Rather than
submitting counting queries via the Laplace mechanism (Theorem 2.4), one of the ma-
jor advances Friedman and Schuster [2010] made over the preliminary work done by
Blum et al. [2005] was to submit a single query to find the best splitting attribute in
each node via the Exponential mechanism (Theorem 2.5).
Friedman and Schuster [2010] proposed building a decision tree by querying the
dataset twice at each node:
Friedman and Schuster’s Query 1. first, get a count of how many records are in the
node, followed by
Friedman and Schuster’s Query 2. find the best attribute to split the records with.
These two non-leaf queries are also used by Patil and Singh [2014],
Fletcher and Islam [2015a] and Rana et al. [2016] in their greedy tree algorithms,
which we discuss later in this section. For any particular level (i.e., depth) of the
decision tree, all the nodes contain disjoint subsets of the dataset, allowing for parallel
composition to be used (Theorem 2.3). The privacy budget spent on the two parallel
queries at each level of the tree can then be summed using composition (Theorem 2.2).
This means that for a given total privacy budget β, each query submitted to the
dataset has a portion of the budget equal to
ǫ =
β
2d
,
an m-fold improvement over the proof-of-concept algorithm offered by
Blum et al. [2005]. Note that the first query (i.e., the support of a node) is only
used as part of the algorithm’s termination criteria (Section 3.4) and for pruning
(Section 3.5), and is not discussed here.
Using the Exponential mechanism, the best attribute to split records in a node
with can be outputted with high probability. The probability of any given output be-
ing chosen by the Exponential mechanism depends on the scoring function, which in
this case is the splitting function. Common splitting functions are information gain
[Quinlan 1993], gain ratio [Quinlan 1996], and gini index [Breiman et al. 1984]. Fried-
man and Schuster analyzed each of these; not in terms of utility performance (which
has been done many times in non-private scenarios [Li and Belford 2002; Islam 2012;
Katz et al. 2012]), but in terms of how sensitive they were to individual records. The
sensitivity of a function directly impacts how much noise needs to be added to achieve
differential privacy. In their experiments Friedman and Schuster found that due to its
low sensitivity, using max operator [Breiman et al. 1984] (see Section 2.2.1) as their
splitting function achieved the highest prediction accuracy, despite it being the least
sophisticated of the tested functions. Their findings can be see in Figure 3. This demon-
strates that taking a function that performs well in non-private scenarios and making
it differentially-private does not necessarily continue to perform well in private scenar-
ios. Gini Index also achieved competitive results, having much lower sensitivity than
Information Gain.
Interestingly, Friedman and Schuster [2010] were unable to test Gain Ratio due to
its erratic behavior when the denominator of the ratio approaches zero. Quinlan’s
C4.5 algorithm [Quinlan 1996] solved this problem with additional heuristics, but ul-
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Fig. 3. The prediction accuracy achieved when building Friedman and Schuster’s decision tree with three
different splitting criteria, using the Adult dataset. Based on results presented in Friedman and Schuster
[2010].
timately the sensitivity of Gain Ratio cannot be bounded and thus cannot be imple-
mented with the Laplace mechanism or the Exponential mechanism.
3.2.1. Reducing the Sensitivity of Splitting Functions. In an effort to reduce the amount of
noise induced in the tree-building process, Fletcher and Islam [2015a] explored reduc-
ing the sensitivity of the splitting functions. Instead of using the theoretical worst-
case scenario to calculate the global sensitivity of a function, they took advantage of
the (otherwise underused; see Section 3.8) first query by Friedman and Schuster and
calculated the local sensitivity of the gini index in the node being split. Friedman and
Schuster’s first query returns the support of the node, and this (now public) informa-
tion can be used by the user to propose a better-bounded sensitivity to the server. The
authors proved that the sensitivity of the gini index could be reduced from ∆ = 0.5 to
∆ = 1−
(
ni
ni + 1
)2
−
(
1
ni + 1
)2
, (5)
where ni is the support of the node being split, node i. Reductions in sensitivity such as
this one directly reduce the noise induced by mechanisms like the Laplace mechanism
and the Exponential mechanism.
To be fully differentially-private however, the sensitivity reduction proposed by
Fletcher and Islam [2015a] needs to be “smoothed” out to account for all neighbor-
ing datasets y, including datasets at a distance k > 1 from x. In its proposed form,
the sensitivity that the user calculates using Equation 5 is actually noisy, since ni is
noisy. The server might therefore reject the proposed sensitivity if it is too small, since
it would not properly provide differential privacy. A rough “buffer” could be added to
the estimated sensitivity to make it more likely to be accepted by the server (a simi-
lar strategy is used by Rana et al. [2016] when calculating continuous splitting points,
discussed in Section 3.2.2), but ultimately this is not mathematically rigorous enough
for differential privacy. Conversely, if the exact sensitivity is outputted to the user and
only neighbors y where k = 1 are considered, the sensitivity itself can leak private
information [Nissim et al. 2007].
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Smooth sensitivity, proposed by Nissim et al. [2007], solves this problem with
Fletcher and Islam [2015b]’s local sensitivity by taking it one step further.
Nissim et al. [2007] propose an exact calculation of the local sensitivity that is strongly
differentially private. Essentially, smooth sensitivity finds the maximum amount that
a function f ’s output can change when k records are added or removed, given the spe-
cific input data x. This differs from the traditional global sensitivity not only because
it considers the actual data instead of the theoretical worst-case scenario, but also be-
cause it considers neighboring datasets y that are more than one record away from x.
Smooth sensitivity considers the most that the output of f could change at any dis-
tance k, “smoothly” lowering the probabilistic weights of larger distances k. Put more
formally, the (non-private) local sensitivity is:
Definition 3.1 (Local Sensitivity [Nissim et al. 2007]). For f : Dn → Rd where
n, d ∈ N, and data x ∈ Dn, the local sensitivity of f at x (with respect to the ℓ1 metric)
is
LSf(x) = max
y:||x−y||1≤1
||f(x)− f(y)||1 . (6)
Local sensitivity can then be extended to any distance k and smoothed:
Definition 3.2 (Smooth Sensitivity [Nissim et al. 2007]). The local sensitivity of f ,
with distance k between datasets x and y, is
Sk(x) = max
y:||x−y||1≤k
LSf (y) . (7)
The smooth sensitivity of f can now be expressed using Sk(x):
S∗(f, x) = max
k=0,1,...,n
e−kǫSk(x) (8)
where ǫ is the privacy budget of f .
Smooth sensitivity is successfully used in a random decision tree algorithm proposed
by Fletcher and Islam [2016], discussed later in Section 3.3.
Interestingly, the inability to bound the sensitivity of Gain Ratio discovered by
Friedman and Schuster [2010] could also have been circumvented by using smooth
sensitivity. In fact, using smooth sensitivity would have allowed all four splitting func-
tions (including Gini Index) to add less noise than was added by Friedman and Schus-
ter, provided that the functions are applied to the data using the Exponential mecha-
nism. This would be an interesting direction to explore in future research; using the
smooth sensitivity of each of the splitting functions instead of the global sensitivity.
We discuss these possibilities in Section 5.
3.2.2. Continuous Attributes. Friedman and Schuster [2010] also conducted a prelimi-
nary exploration into using splitting functions on continuous attributes. Using an
attribute value from among the records in a node is a breach of privacy, so another
solution is needed. Friedman and Schuster propose using the Exponential mechanism
to select the best range of attribute values for splitting, where all the values in the
range output the same score from the splitting function. A data-independent value
can then be uniformly randomly selected from the chosen range. Unfortunately, this
approach requires a far higher number of queries than simply selecting the best dis-
crete attribute to split a node with, requiring the privacy budget to be divided such
that
ǫ =
β
(2 + n)d
(9)
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where n is the number of continuous (i.e., numerical) attributes. For even small num-
bers of continuous attributes, this is a substantial increase in the amount of noise
added to each query. To the best of our knowledge, there has not been a more budget-
efficient method proposed for selecting the splitting point of continuous attributes in
a (strongly) differentially-private way, other than discretizing the attribute first. This
is a weakness that would need to be addressed before greedy heuristics such as split-
ting functions can be considered a viable way to build a differentially-private classifier
when continuous attributes are involved.
Rana et al. [2016] explored one possible way of efficiently finding a continuous split-
ting point, but it required weakening the definition of differential privacy. For a given
continuous attribute x, rather than spending a large amount of β to find the optimal
splitting value like Friedman and Schuster, the authors instead find the average x
value for all the records in that node that have class label c1, and similarly for c2.
The chosen splitting value is defined as halfway between those two average values.
While this approach does not maximize the discriminatory power of the child nodes, it
increases the budget per query from Friedman and Schuster’s ǫ = β(2+n)d to
ǫ =
β
3d
, (10)
thus reducing noise.
To make this query (weakly) differentially-private, Rana et al. [2016] add Laplace
noise Lap(∆/ǫ), where the sensitivity ∆ is based on the smaller of the two class counts,
∆ = 3/min(nc1 , nc2). Instead of using smooth sensitivity or a strictly-correct global
sensitivity, Rana et al. opt to assume that the continuous attributes have a normal dis-
tribution and estimate the sensitivity within 3 standard deviations, which is adequate
in 99.7% of cases (assuming the assumption holds). While not strictly differentially
private, Rana et al. keep in the spirit of their weakened definition of differential pri-
vacy (analyzed in detail in Section 3.6) and instead heuristically add an amount of
noise that could be considered “adequately private” in most scenarios. The assump-
tion they choose to make is somewhat self-defeating however, as it negates one of the
well-known advantages of decision trees; their non-parametric independence from the
underlying distribution of the data.
3.3. Leaf Queries
The information required from the data in a leaf node is quite different from the in-
formation required in a non-leaf node. Rather than learning the best attribute to par-
tition the data with, the purpose of a leaf node is to predict the class label of unla-
beled records that are filtered to the leaf. A different query from the ones discussed in
Section 3.2 is therefore required; one related to the class labels of the training records
in the leaf node.
A counting query is the most straight-forward solution, and is the solution
used by almost every differentially private decision tree algorithm that we
know of [Blum et al. 2005; Friedman and Schuster 2010; Jagannathan et al. 2012;
Fletcher and Islam 2015a; Fletcher and Islam 2015b; Mohammed et al. 2015;
Patil and Singh 2014; Rana et al. 2016]. Conceptually, one can consider the query as
a single query submitted in parallel to all j leaf nodes, returning a histogram of the
class counts in those nodes: {
ncj + Lap(1/ǫ); ∀c ∈ C
}
; ∀j . (11)
Alternatively, one can recognize (in much the same way that [Dwork et al. 2006] origi-
nally discovered) that since each count in a histogram is disjoint from the other counts,
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each class count in each leaf is simply being queried in parallel. These counts are made
differentially-private by adding Lap(1/ǫ) (see Theorem 2.4).
The size of ǫ in Equation 11 depends on howmuch of the privacy budget is remaining
after querying the non-leaf nodes. This is where random decision trees, described in
Section 2.2.2, gain a unique advantage; they do not query the non-leaf nodes at all.
Jagannathan et al. [2012] were the first to investigate the idea of an ensemble of τ
differentially-private random decision trees, spending the budget allocated to each tree
on one query: Equation 11. In other words, each class count in each leaf node in each
tree has Lap(1/ǫ) added to it, where
ǫ =
β
τ
. (12)
Deciding how large τ should be is discussed later in Section 3.6; suffice to say that
Jagannthan et al. recommend τ = 10. This is close to the portion of the budget allo-
cated to the leaf nodes of the greedy trees proposed by Friedman and Schuster [2010]
when using their recommended depth d = 5 (assuming few continuous attributes; see
Equation 9) and Rana et al. [2016] (see Equation 10).
Jagannathan et al. [2012]’s strategy proved successful; empirically, their random ap-
proach produces higher quality classifiers than Friedman and Schuster [2010]’s greedy
approach. Figure 4 presents prediction accuracy comparisons with several datasets
from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [Bache and Lichman 2013]. Similarly to
how the max operator splitting function outperformed more sophisticated functions in
Section 3.2, these results suggest that the benefits of using a splitting function that is
more sophisticated than randomness may be lost when the output is so noisy. Instead,
the ability to make multiple trees proves to be more valuable than building a single
tree.
What random trees sacrifice is a lot of the discriminatory power created in each
node by the splitting functions of greedy decision trees, and this is clearest when
handling continuous attributes; rather than finding the optimal splitting point like
Friedman and Schuster [2010], or an average value that tries to separate two bi-
nary class labels like Rana et al. [2016], Jagannathan et al. simply randomly choose
a splitting point from the attribute’s domain with uniform probability. This is the
same strategy taken by traditional, non-private random decision trees [Fan et al. 2003;
Geurts et al. 2006]. Despite the average random node being less discriminatory than
the average greedy node, the overall prediction accuracy of an ensemble of random
trees has been shown to be very similar to the accuracy of an ensemble of greedy trees
[Geurts et al. 2006].
3.3.1. Using Smooth Sensitivity. To the best of our knowledge, the only differentially-
private decision tree algorithm to take advantage of smooth sensitivity
[Nissim et al. 2007] is Fletcher and Islam [2016]. In order to use smooth sensi-
tivity in the leaf nodes of a tree, the authors propose using a different query to the
one presented in Equation 11. Smooth sensitivity cannot help with counting queries;
no matter what the specific data in x is, the output of a counting query can always
change by one when one record is added or removed.
Similarly to how Friedman and Schuster [2010] improved upon Blum et al. [2005]’s
original work by using the Exponential mechanism instead of the Laplace mechanism
in the non-leaf nodes (see Section 3.2), Fletcher and Islam [2016] do the same with
the leaf nodes, outputting the majority class label with the Exponential mechanism.
They observed that if the intent of the leaf nodes is only to output a majority label,
then the actual counts of the labels are largely irrelevant. Of course, this sacrifices
the ability to learn any details about the leaf nodes for the sake of higher accuracy.
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Fig. 4. Comparing the prediction accuracy of Jagannathan et al.’s random decision forest algorithm (JPW)
to Friedman and Schuster’s greedy decision tree algorithm (FS) with seven datasets, when ǫ = 1. Based on
results presented in Fletcher and Islam [2016].
Properties such as the support and confidence of the leaf nodes cannot be learned,
as no numbers are outputted by the algorithm; only the majority labels. This makes
it difficult to discover knowledge from the private data, such as the size or strength
of the randomly generated rules. While not completely trustworthy due to the noise
added, algorithms such as [Jagannathan et al. 2012]’s random decision forest do allow
for this kind of knowledge discovery. As is almost always the case when balancing the
tension between privacy and utility however, the knowledge discovery comes at a cost;
Jagannathan et al.’s algorithm is much less accurate at predicting the labels of unseen
data. This can be empirically seen in Figure 5. There is no free lunch when it comes
to privacy [Kifer and Machanavajjhala 2011]; it would be up to the user to decide if
they want to sacrifice either knowledge discovery or prediction accuracy. These sorts of
trade-offs are often present when designing a differentially-private algorithm, making
it important to have clearly defined objectives for what you want the algorithm to
achieve.
To output the majority (i.e., most frequent) label in a leaf node with
the Exponential mechanism, a scoring function (see Theorem 2.5) is required;
Fletcher and Islam [2016] proposed a piecewise linear function to achieve this:
u(c, xi) =
{
1 c = argmaxc∈C n
c
i
0 otherwise
, (13)
where nci is the number of occurrences of label c ∈ C in node i. Each label will have a
score of 1 if the label is the most frequently occurring label in the leaf, and 0 otherwise.
The global sensitivity ∆(u) of this function is 1, since adding or removing one record
could theoretically change a score from 1 to 0 or vice-versa. The authors demonstrate
that the smooth sensitivity, however, is often much lower:
S∗(u, xi) = e
−jǫ (14)
where j is the difference between the most frequent and the second-most frequent
labels in node i, nc1i − nc2i .
By taking advantage of smooth sensitivity, Fletcher and Islam [2016] were able to
improve the accuracy of a random decision forest. Some empirical results are presented
in Figure 5, where the random decision forest proposed by Fletcher and Islam [2016]
is compared to the one proposed by Jagannathan et al. [2012].
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Fig. 5. Comparing the prediction accuracy of Fletcher and Islam’s random decision forest (FI) to Jagan-
nathan et al.’s random decision forest (JPW) with seven datasets, when ǫ = 1. Based on results presented
in Fletcher and Islam [2016].
The performance of smooth sensitivity here naturally prompts us to ask: what about
greedy decision trees? What is the smooth sensitivity of splitting functions like infor-
mation gain and gini index? Can the sensitivity of gain ratio now be calculated, some-
thing that Friedman and Schuster [2010] demonstrated was not possible when using
the global sensitivity? To the best of our knowledge, these questions remain open, and
could be the key to allowing (strongly) differentially-private greedy decision trees that
match the performance of random decision trees, while also offering the opportunity for
better knowledge discovery. We discuss these possibilities for the future in Section 5.
3.4. Termination Criteria
Knowing when to stop growing a decision tree is important in traditional non-private
algorithms, but is even more important for a differentially-private decision tree algo-
rithm. This is due to two main reasons:
(1) When querying non-leaf nodes, only sibling nodes can be queried in parallel; differ-
ent generations (i.e. levels) of nodes must have their privacy costs composed (see
Section 2.1). The larger the depth, the more queries there are that need to be paid
for.
(2) The data is split into smaller partitions as a tree gets deeper, and the smaller the
class counts are in a leaf node, the larger the effect of the Lap(1/ǫ) noise added to
them.
The first reason affects only greedy trees, while the second affects both greedy trees
and random trees. Throughout the literature, four main types of termination criteria
are used when building either type of differentially-private tree:
Criteria 1. a user-defined criteria, such as maximum depth d
[Friedman and Schuster 2010; Fletcher and Islam 2015a; Patil and Singh 2014]
or minimum node support n′ [Rana et al. 2016];
Criteria 2. a maximum depth based on the number of attributes m
[Friedman and Schuster 2010; Jagannathan et al. 2012; Fletcher and Islam 2016];
Criteria 3. defining a minimum node support n′ based on the ratio between the
support and the added noise, and then either
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a. using an estimation n˜i of node i’s support to decide whether to terminate
[Jagannathan et al. 2012; Fletcher and Islam 2015b]; or
b. querying the actual support ni of node i to more accurately determine
whether to terminate [Friedman and Schuster 2010].
Having the user define a maximum depth is the simplest approach, but it is also
a naive approach that does not take into account any differences between datasets
(unless the user employs some personal heuristics when making their decision).
Friedman and Schuster [2010] used this criteria in conjunction with two other ter-
mination criteria. Other researchers [Fletcher and Islam 2015a; Patil and Singh 2014]
use it as a placeholder criteria; their research does not focus on this component of the
algorithm, but d nonetheless needs to be defined in order to divide the budget β among
the queries. Many of the equations for dividing the budget β in Section 3.2 refer to a
maximum tree depth d, such as Equation 9 and Equation 10.
Rana et al. [2016] propose having the user define a minimum node support to act
as the termination criteria, rather than a maximum tree depth. They define n′ as a
some small fraction (such as 0.1%) of the total number of records n, where a node
will not be split if any of the subsequent child nodes would have any class counts
less than n′. This has a similar result to other minimum node support criteria (such
as Friedman and Schuster [2010]’s and Fletcher and Islam [2015b]’s, discussed later),
except that Rana et al. rely on the user to manually define n′ rather than using a
heuristic. Unfortunately, this approach leads to a problem: if we don’t know how deep
the tree will grow before we start querying the data, how do we decide what fraction of
the privacy budget β each query gets? For this reason, relying solely on n′ to terminate
tree growth is not enough, and we include a maximum tree depth d when discussing
the privacy budgeting of Rana et al.’s approach (such as in Equation 10). Note that
using a minimum support criteria also requires querying the data in each node, which
we discuss at the end of this section.
Friedman and Schuster [2010]’s algorithm uses two more termination criteria, the
next of which is based the number of attributesm. They only use it to avoid a logic error
though; since discrete attributes can only be used once, the tree-building algorithm
terminates if all discrete attributes have been tested (i.e. if d = m). For most datasets,
m will be larger than the user-defined maximum depth, leading to this termination
criteria rarely being used.
The number of attributes can be used for more than just preventing logic errors
though. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, Fan et al. [2003]’s combinatorial reasoning sug-
gests that an ensemble of random trees has optimal diversity (and thus good discrim-
inatory power) when each tree has a depth of d = m/2, and Jagannathan et al. [2012]
propose using the same idea with differentially-private random trees. Because random
trees do not query the data in non-leaf nodes, the portioning of the budget is indepen-
dent of d (see Equation 12), allowing random trees to use whatever depth is considered
optimal for non-private random trees.
Note that using d = m/2 assumes that all the attributes can only be selected once
in any root-to-leaf path. This is true for discrete attributes, but not continuous at-
tributes. Fletcher and Islam [2016] updated Fan et al. [2003]’s tree depth calculation
to take into account continuous attributes, so that the number of different attributes
tested in each root-to-leaf path remains optimal at m/2 different attributes tested. In
other words, the authors proved that the optimal tree depth d when using m continu-
ous attributes is
d = argmin
δ:X<m/2
E[X |δ]
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where X is the number of attributes not tested on a root-to-leaf path of depth δ,
E[X |δ] = m
(
m− 1
m
)δ
.
There is one caveat with just using the same depth as non-private random trees
though; if m is large (and the tree is therefore deep), the tree might partition the
data so many times that each leaf node ends up having a very small fraction of the
total dataset size n. If the average support of the leaf nodes is small, adding Lap(1/ǫ)
to each class count (see Section 3.2) might completely overwhelm them with noise.
Jagannathan et al. [2012] therefore proposed a heuristic that uses the third type of
termination criteria (i.e. estimating the nodes’ support) and combined it with the m/2
criteria:
d = min(m/2 , logb n− 1) (15)
wherem is the number of attributes, n is the number of records in the dataset, and b is
the average “branching factor” of the attributes. The branching factor of an attribute
refers to how many child nodes will be created if a node is split using that attribute.
This is the same as the domain size of the attribute if it uses discrete values, and
is equal to b = 2 if the attribute is continuous. Functionally, logb n − 1 is setting the
maximum depth to one less than the number of times n can be partitioned evenly by
each node (where each node has the average number of child nodes b) until the bottom
nodes have support equal to one.
Equation 15 acknowledges that small class counts are more susceptible to noise
than larger counts, but it does not take into account how much noise is being added.
Depending on how small ǫ is, the class counts in the leaf nodes might still be
overwhelmed by the noise when using Equation 15. Fletcher and Islam [2015b] and
Friedman and Schuster [2010] address this shortcoming, described below.
Fletcher and Islam [2015b] propose dynamically defining the maximum tree depth,
with different depths possible in different parts of the same tree. By rephras-
ing the problem in terms of the support “signal” and the Laplace “noise”, the au-
thors define a minimum support threshold that ensures the signal-to-noise ratio
[Van Drongelen 2006] is greater than one:
n′ =
√
2|C|
ǫ
. (16)
If the estimated support of a node is below n′, the node is not split further. This pre-
vents the tree from growing to a point where the noise added to each class count is
likely to be larger than the count itself. Fletcher and Islam [2015b] estimate the sup-
port of a child node i to be n˜j/bj, where n˜j is the estimated support of the parent node j
and bj is the branching factor of the attribute randomly selected by j to split with. This
allows each branch of the tree to continue growing (i.e. increase in depth) until the class
counts are at risk of being overwhelmed by the Laplace noise added to them. Estimat-
ing the support of each node in this way is similar to how Jagannathan et al. [2012]
decide the maximum tree depth with logb n − 1, except that it takes into account that
different parts of the tree can have different numbers of branches. It also adapts to the
size of ǫ, changing the minimum support n′ based on how much noise is going to be
added to each class count.
Both Jagannathan et al. [2012] and Fletcher and Islam [2015b] use b to estimate the
support of nodes, making the assumption that the data will be roughly uniformly di-
vided among all branches. This ensures that tree-building will terminate before the
noise outweighs the class counts if the records are evenly distributed. If this assump-
tion does not hold, and the records clump together in a small number of leaf nodes,
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this is still a good outcome if future unseen records follow the same distribution as
the training records. The noise might completely overwhelm the class counts in small
leaf nodes, but this will only affect a proportionally equally small number of future
predictions.
Friedman and Schuster [2010] solve the shortcoming of Jagannathan et al. [2012]’s
termination criteria (i.e., not taking into account the size of the noise) without using
the branching factor b at all. Instead, they directly query the data in the nodes as they
build the tree. Recall that Friedman and Schuster [2010] propose asking two queries
in each node: one to return the support of the node, and the other to either return the
best attribute to split the node with or to return the class counts if the node is a leaf.
The latter query was addressed in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3; the former query is used
to enable Friedman and Schuster’s third and final termination criteria. Interestingly,
Equation 16 is the same formula that Friedman and Schuster [2010] found through
their experimentation; after approaching the problem of termination criteria from a
different direction, Fletcher and Islam [2015b] discovered an explanation for why it
worked. The main difference is whether n′ is compared to node i’s actual support ni or
its estimated support n˜i.
This termination criteria, along with Rana et al. [2016]’s minimum support crite-
ria discussed earlier, are the only data-dependent criteria proposed in the literature.
Querying the support of each node allows the growth of different parts of the tree to be
more precise than what Fletcher and Islam [2015b] could achieve. It comes at a cost
however; part of the privacy budget β must be spent on this query. It is debatable
whether increasing how precise a termination criteria is is worth part of the budget;
especially if it costs as much as half the budget, as seen in Equation 9 and Equation 10.
Fortunately the extra query that Friedman and Schuster ask in each node is not only
used for the termination criteria; they also use it when pruning the tree. We discuss
this below in Section 3.5.
3.5. Pruning
After a tree has finished being built, pruning (described in Section 2.2) can then be
applied. In order to account for differential privacy and the modifications to a decision
tree algorithm that that entails, conventional pruning strategies also need to be mod-
ified. Friedman and Schuster [2010] propose one such modification for greedy decision
trees, with some additional insight offered by [Fletcher and Islam 2015b].
Friedman and Schuster [2010] use the error-based pruning approach employed by
C4.5 since it does not require additional data (data that could instead be used during
the tree-building process, reducing the impact of the noise). Before performing prun-
ing, they observe that due to the noise added to the support and class counts in each
node, the sum of these counts in each level of the tree do not necessarily match the
total size of the dataset. They therefore first “normalize” the support of each node in
the tree so that the sum of all the nodes on each level of the tree match the number
of records in the whole dataset. They then “normalize” the class counts in a similar
fashion, making sure that the sum of the class counts in each node match the support
of that node. The pruning is then applied as normal. The support ni of the nodes is
normalized using the noisy counts gathered from the additional query the authors ask
in each node (discussed in Section 3.2 and Section 3.4).
We take a moment to note that while this normalization process is helpful, it
is possible that Friedman and Schuster [2010] were motivated by flawed reasoning.
They claim that the process of aggregating class counts in child nodes into the par-
ent node during pruning causes the noise to “add up”, leading to higher variance
in the class counts. In fact, the noise is actually reduced, as described by the “sig-
nal averaging” phenomenon in signal-to-noise ratio theory [Van Drongelen 2006]. Tak-
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ing a similar approach to how they approached termination criteria (see Section 3.4),
[Fletcher and Islam 2015b] express the ratio between a parent node’s support ni (i.e.,
the signal) and its total noise after summing the noise from its set of child nodes J as:
ni
noise
= ǫ
∑J
j nj
|C|
√
2|J | . (17)
Put simply, since the noise added to each count can add or subtract from the original
count, summing multiple noisy counts together causes the noise to “cancel out”. Thus
the noise only scales with the square root of the number of child nodes, not linearly,
nor super-linearly like is suggested by Friedman and Schuster [2010]. This means that
when pruning a differentially-private tree, the class counts become less noisy (i.e.,
more reliable) as more pruning is performed. Of course the tree cannot be pruned too
far, as the tree will start to lose discriminatory power and be less useful, just as is the
case with conventional non-private trees.
When it comes to random decision trees, [Fletcher and Islam 2015b] observed an
interesting phenomena: because nodes are split with a randomly selected attribute, it
is entirely possible that the resulting child nodes are less predictive than the parent
node. In other words, a random split can actually make the tree worse. What this
means is that pruning methods used by greedy trees no longer make sense for random
trees. Instead the authors propose pruning in a way that targets the consequences of
differential privacy: only pruning leaf nodes where the noise is greater than the class
count “signal”. Since the noise in a parent node is less than the sum of the noise in the
child nodes (see Equation 17), the number of prunes required is kept to a minimum,
and the tree is kept as large as possible.
Continuing with the idea that a randomly chosen split might create child nodes with
lower confidence than the parent node, [Fletcher and Islam 2015b] also propose alter-
ing the way that the labels of future records are predicted. For any given root-to-leaf
path followed by an unlabeled record, the authors found that prediction accuracy rose
if the node with the highest confidence is used to predict the record’s label, regardless
of where that node appears on the path.
3.6. Multiple Trees
Another design decision of any decision tree algorithm is the number of random de-
cision trees to build. If the trees are built randomly, a large number of trees are re-
quired to result in a good classifier (i.e., a decision forest, see Section 2.2.2). This is a
core concept behind traditional, non-private random decision forests [Fan et al. 2003;
Geurts et al. 2006], and is still true for differentially private random decision forests
[Jagannathan et al. 2012]. If the trees are built greedily, building more trees is not as
necessary, but still beneficial [Islam and Giggins 2011]. This is especially true if they
are built using bootstrapped samples and random subsets of the attributes, increasing
the diversity of the trees and decreasing the model’s susceptibility to small changes in
the training data, which in turn reduces over-fitting [Breiman 2001a].
Unfortunately in the private scenario, each tree added to a forest comes with a cost;
if each tree is built using the full dataset, the trees are not disjoint and cannot be
queried in parallel (see Section 2.1). If the records are divided into disjoint subsets
for each tree, the leaf nodes will have much lower support, and therefore less reli-
able majority class labels. The smaller a class count is, the larger the relative ef-
fect of adding Lap(1/ǫ) to it is. When using random decision trees, both strategies
have been experimented with [Jagannathan et al. 2012; Fletcher and Islam 2015b;
Fletcher and Islam 2016]; in the case of greedy trees, only dividing the privacy budget
has been tried [Patil and Singh 2014; Fletcher and Islam 2015a], with the feasibility
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of using disjoint data remaining an open question. We explore what conclusions can be
made about building multiple differentially-private decision trees below.
Patil and Singh [2014] were the first to take a differentially-private greedy decision
tree, such as the one proposed by Friedman and Schuster [2010], and expanding it into
a forest. Their approach was to use bootstrapped samples in each differentially-private
tree, in the same way as Breiman’s Random Forest algorithm [Breiman 2001a]. In the
eyes of differential privacy, sampling a dataset of size n with replacement n times (i.e.
boostrapping) is almost identical to using the same data in every tree, and thus the
privacy costs of the queries must be composed (Section 2.1). Some work has been done
on calculating what privacy savings can be made by using bootstrapped data, since it
is not exactly the same as querying the original n records [Rana et al. 2016], however
thus far only approximations have been made, which do not guarantee differential
privacy in the strongest sense. We explore these approximations later in Section 3.7.
In their empirical results, Patil and Singh [2014] demonstrated the infeasibility of
their approach; even with a modest forest size of τ = 20 trees and a tree depth of d = 5,
the resulting classifier has poor prediction accuracy with very high variance. If part of
the privacy budget β is needed for one query in each level of a tree, for every tree, each
query only receives
ǫ =
β
dτ
(18)
of the budget, leading to a very large amount of noise being added to each query for
any reasonable budget β.
Fletcher and Islam [2015a] experimented further with making a forest of greedy
trees, reducing the number of trees from Patil and Singh [2014]’s 20 trees to only four,
and reducing the sensitivity of the queries to reduce the amount of noise required in
each level of the trees. Their experiments indicated that a small number of trees often
performed better than a single tree, despite the privacy budget having to be spread
more thinly among multiple trees. When tested without the improved sensitivity how-
ever, the accuracy of the forest was basically the same as a single tree. These findings
demonstrate that while increasing the number of greedy trees can be beneficial, it
heavily relies on the noise in each query being reduced in other ways to compensate
for dividing the β among multiple trees.
Random decision trees, on the other hand, are only useful when part of a larger forest
[Fan et al. 2003; Geurts et al. 2006]. In the context of differential privacy, their great-
est advantage over greedy trees is the complete removal of queries in the non-leaf lev-
els of the trees. This allows the budget for each query to rise from that of Equation 18
to:
ǫ =
β
τ
. (19)
Jagannathan et al. [2012] used this advantage and searched for the ideal number of
random decision trees to build differentially-privately. They chose to use all the data in
each tree, and divide the budget as shown in Equation 19. Experimentally, the authors
concluded that τ = 10 was the ideal number of random trees to build. Unfortunately,
there is no mathematical or heuristical explanation for this number; their only advice
is that in their experiments, datasets with less than 500 records worked best with only
τ = 5 trees, and that otherwise ten trees worked well.
Some theory was later developed by Bojarski et al. [2014] that offered some prob-
abilistic bounds on the prediction accuracy of a differentially-private random forest,
based on the number of trees and the depth of those trees. The authors released a pre-
liminary version of their research on arXiv.org, presenting theorems for bounding both
training error and testing error (in other words, classifying training data and non-
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. X, No. Y, Article Z, Publication date: November 2016.
Z:22 S. Fletcher & M.Z. Islam
training data). Notably, they propose that to correctly classify most new (non-training)
data, a logarithmic number of random decision trees τ is needed, relative to the num-
ber of training records n. In their experiments, the number of trees went as high as 21,
but also as low as one. This lines up reasonably well with Jagannathan et al. [2012]’s
recommendation of using τ = 10. Rana et al. [2016] implemented the findings of
Bojarski et al. [2014] as a comparative decision forest in their experiments, with mixed
results. Since proofs of the proposed bounds have not yet been released, it is difficult
to discern their efficacy.
Taking a heuristical approach, Fletcher and Islam [2015b] proposed basing the num-
ber of random trees on two factors: the number of attributes m; and the “minimally
acceptable tree size”, defined as a tree with a depth of d = 3. The authors developed a
heuristic whereby the the budget assigned to each tree ǫ = β/τ would not be so small
that their minimum support threshold n′ (see Equation 16) would prevent a tree from
splitting at least twice; in other words if
|C|√2
ǫ
>
n
b2
,
where b is the average branching factor. What this means is that the number of trees
τ has an upper bound, so that ǫ can be large enough to allow for minimally acceptable
tree sizes.
They additionally maximized tree diversity by requiring that each tree’s root node
use a unique attribute to split with, with another upper bound on the number of trees
being the number of attributes; τ ≤ m. Any additional trees would contribute less
unique information on average than the first m trees, causing inefficient spending of
β. A heuristical solution to Jagannathan et al.’s difficulties in defining the number of
trees was therefore to define it as:
τ = min
(
βn√
2|C|b2 , m
)
.
Fletcher and Islam [2016] researched building an ensemble of differentially-private
random trees from a different angle: they proposed using sampling without replace-
ment (i.e., disjoint subsets of dataset x) in each tree, rather than using all of the data
in each tree. This strategy has some of the benefits of the bootstrap sampling originally
proposed by Breiman [2001a] (i.e., sampling with replacement) in that it reduces the
variance caused by individual records, but the authors’ main reason for sampling with-
out replacement is to allow the algorithm to use parallel composition (Theorem 2.3).
This is interesting, because in many cases (such as counting queries) the difference
between using small subsets of data in parallel versus using small fractions of the
privacy budget with all the data is a zero-sum game. You can add Lap(k/ǫ) noise to a
count of size n, or you can add Lap(1/ǫ) noise to a count of size n/k; the noise remains
proportional to the data. What Fletcher and Islam [2016] found however, is that this
did not hold true when using the Exponential mechanism with smooth sensitivity (see
Section 3.3.1), since a larger budget ǫ improved both the numerator and denominator
of Equation 2, while a larger j (which scales asymptotically linearly with data size n)
only improved the denominator.
Another natural consequence of reducing the noise in the leaf nodes with smooth
sensitivity is that it means a smaller proportion of the budget is required to get the
same level of accuracy. Fletcher and Islam [2016] found that this allowed their algo-
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rithm to build a much larger forest, gaining the benefit of 100 votes2 per predicted
class label instead of the 10 offered by [Jagannathan et al. 2012].
3.7. Weakening the Privacy Requirements
Jagannathan and Pillaipakkamnatt, this time joined by Monteleoni, extended the
work they did with Wright the previous year to make a semi-supervised classifier in
a semi-private scenario [Jagannathan et al. 2013]. The scenario they describe is one
where the user has a large number of unlabeled non-private (i.e., public) records, and
a small number of labeled private (i.e., sensitive) records. The authors propose an al-
gorithm that uses the unlabeled records in two ways. First, to find dense regions of the
data hypercube and partition those regions when building decision trees, aiming to
spread the records evenly among the leaf nodes. Second, to use a small differentially-
private random forest built from the private (labeled) data to classify the non-private
(unlabeled) data, and then build a large non-private decision forest with the non-
private data. The final classifier is then the union of the two decision forests.
The main weakness of this approach is its applicability in the real world. We ques-
tion how often a user would find themselves in a situation that meets all of the criteria:
a large number of records that are both unlabeled and non-private, and a small num-
ber of records that are both labeled and private, with both types of records being from
the same distribution.
Taking a different approach, Rana et al. [2016] proposed a greedy decision for-
est algorithm that used a weaker definition of differential privacy. By weaken-
ing the requirements of differential privacy, it allowed the forest to be much
larger than previous forests made of greedy decision trees [Patil and Singh 2014;
Fletcher and Islam 2015a]. Rather than hiding whether an individual’s record is in
a dataset with high probability, Rana et al.’s weakened definition of differential pri-
vacy makes sure that any estimate a user makes about a specific attribute value has
the same variance as it did before the user made any queries, with high probability.
In other words, their definition prevents an individual’s values being discovered (at-
tribute linkage), but not whether or not the individual is in the dataset (table linkage)
[Fung et al. 2010]. In the paper, the scope of this definition is limited to an ensemble
of decision trees using bootstrapped samples; no work has yet been done to extend it
to other scenarios.
Similar to Patil and Singh [2014], the authors propose a greedy decision forest algo-
rithm that builds τ trees in the same fashion as Friedman and Schuster [2010], where
each tree uses a random sub-sample of the total dataset. Rather than using a budget
of ǫ = β/τ in each tree, Rana et al. distinguish their algorithm from others by allowing
the user to manually define ǫ (where ǫ ≤ β), with each tree using that amount. They
demonstrate that their weakened definition of differential privacy is preserved by the
resulting decision forest as long as the number of trees is limited to:
τ ≤ 1
p(1− p)
(
n′(n′ + 1) +
1
ǫ2
)
, (20)
where n′ is the minimum support of leaf nodes, p is the probability of any randomly
chosen class label being the least common class label, and ǫ is the user-defined privacy
budget per tree. As discussed in Section 3.4, n′ is user-defined here. Note that Rana et
al. only present formulas for scenarios with a binary class.3 Equation 20 only bounds
the forest size in terms of preserving the class attribute; Rana et al. also define an
2By “votes”, we mean the predictions made by each individual tree in the forest, with the most popular
prediction overall being the final prediction.
3They also provide several additional parameters in the paper, which we generalize here to avoid minutiae.
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upper bound on the number of trees to ensure no leakage of non-class attribute values,
however in practice this bound is much higher than the bound based on the class
attribute so we do not include it here.
3.8. Query Efficiency
In this section, we use Friedman and Schuster [2010]’s differentially-private greedy
decision tree as a case study in how to efficiently query a dataset when designing a
data mining algorithm, and how to save parts of the privacy budget where possible.
In Section 3.2, we discussed how Friedman and Schuster [2010] asked two queries
per node. The authors divided the privacy budget β evenly among all the queries, with
each query having ǫ = β/2d, where d is the depth of the tree. One natural question
might be, “is the first query in each node (which outputs the support) useful enough
to be worth half the budget?”. While no research has directly explored this question,
a differentially-private decision tree proposed by Mohammed et al. [2015] takes a very
similar approach to Friedman and Schuster, but removes the first query in each node.
This allows the splitting function in each node to have twice as much of the budget,
ǫ = β/d. Mohammed et al. demonstrated that not only can a differentially-private
greedy tree be built with only one query per node, but that it actually achieves higher
prediction accuracy than Friedman and Schuster’s version that has the more precise
termination criteria and pruning.
While ultimately resulting in lower prediction accuracy, Friedman and Schuster
demonstrated an important concept when designing differentially-private algorithms:
using queries that can achieve multiple purposes at once. By using the support of each
node in two separate components of their algorithm (termination criteria and prun-
ing), the authors got more “bang for their buck”. Differential privacy is immune to
post-processing [Dwork and Roth 2013], so outputs that can be used multiple times to
improve a classifier are essentially “free” optimizations.
We can also observe that in Section 3.4, Friedman and Schuster’s Criteria 3b will
never be used by the algorithm if n/bd is larger than the standard deviation of the
Laplace noise,
√
2/ǫ; one of the other two criteria will always occur first. If this is the
case for a particular dataset, querying the support of each node is no longer useful for
the termination criteria, and is only useful for pruning. The query was of questionable
utility when it had two purposes (termination and pruning), let alone one, and should
probably be skipped in this case, saving half the budget. We can take this idea further
and ask ourselves: would we even want to terminate tree-building at d ≤ 2? If not,
then why not only query the support of nodes when d > 2, thus reducing the number
of queries by two?
We should also first check the two data-independent criteria (Criteria 1 and Criteria
2) at each level, and maybe not query the support if one of the other criteria is already
terminating the tree’s growth. On the topic of the other two criteria, note how termi-
nating because all the attributes m have been tested is unlikely to occur unless m is
less than the user-definedmaximum depth d. However, this termination criteria differs
from the minimum support criteria in that it does not cost us anything, since it does
not rely on the data. We can afford to have redundant components in the algorithm, as
long as they do not cost us.4
If the user still wishes to query the support of each node (or perhaps ask some
other non-compulsory query), they can consider whether every query should have an
even proportion of the total budget. To the best of our knowledge, all research around
4Of course, computational complexity may also want to be considered, however in privacy scenarios we
often want to maximize the utility-to-privacy trade-off, and are unwilling to compromise for the sake of
other trade-offs like utility-to-complexity.
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differentially-private trees has divided β evenly, such as ǫ = β/2d or ǫ = β/τ . This is
not required however, and it is worth considering if it is more important that certain
queries are less noisy, and that other queries can afford to be noisy without sacrificing
too much utility.
These sorts of heuristics can lead to large budget savings, and thus a better classifier.
While we used Friedman and Schuster [2010]’s algorithm as a case study, similar ideas
can be used when designing any differentially-private algorithm.
4. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER: IMPLEMENTATIONS
All the algorithms we discuss in this survey achieve the same basic goal of outputting
information about nodes in a differentially-private way, but do so with a wide variety of
strategies. Some algorithms intelligently find patterns in the data, providing the user
with knowledge and not just a black-box classifier. Other algorithms sacrifice every-
thing that is not absolutely necessary in order to build an accurate classifier, submit-
ting as few queries as possible. These two extremes, and everything in between, offer
different trade-offs between knowledge, accuracy, noise, and privacy costs. Cleverly us-
ing the privacy budget is imperative when designing an effective differentially-private
decision tree classifier.
Table I summarizes the main properties of all the algorithms discussed. While no
table could properly capture all the details of these algorithms, Table I provides a good
overview and can act as a quick reference. Figure 4 and Figure 5 provide some context
for the “Low/Medium/High” categories in the “Prediction Accuracy” column.
In some cases, such as some of the cells in the “Tree Depth d” and “Forest Size
τ” columns, the values provided are not inherently part of the proposed algorithm,
but are instead the recommended values for parameters that are user-defined. For
example, Mohammed et al. [2015] recommend setting the user-defined depth to d = 4,
but since they only propose a decision tree algorithm and not a forest, their forest size
is inherently τ = 1. In the case of Rana et al. [2016]’s algorithm, the authors do not
specify d in their paper, and the size of their forest is defined by Equation 20 but is
usually τ > 500.
Some cells are labeled as “Maximized Diversity”, by which we refer to the combi-
natorial reasoning put forth by Fan et al. [2003] to maximize the attribute diversity
of the trees, discussed in Section 3.4. The inclusion of “(Discrete)” in these cells in-
dicates that the authors only accounted for discrete attributes, and not continuous
attributes. For Jagannathan et al. [2013]’s work, we describe the forest size as “5 then
200”, referring to the fact that the algorithm builds two separate decision forests; a
small differentially-private one, and then a large non-private one. The algorithm pro-
posed by [Fletcher and Islam 2015b] uses a dynamic tree depth, with the minimum
support threshold of each branch being updated as the tree grows. The “Handles Cont.
Attributes” column lists whether an algorithm handles continuous attributes, or only
discrete attributes.
The details of all the algorithms summarized in Table I are discussed and compared
throughout Section 3.
5. LOOKING FORWARD
Looking forward into the future of differentially private trees, several open questions
catch our attention. While random trees currently reign supreme when it comes to
prediction accuracy (see Figure 4), the recent developments with smooth sensitivity
[Fletcher and Islam 2016] offer some promising possibilities for greedy trees. We won-
der if using smooth sensitivity would lower the noise enough to allow the Exponen-
tial mechanism to output the best splitting attribute (see Section 3.2) more reliably at
low ǫ values. Not only would this improve single greedy trees, but it might open the
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Table I. A comparison of the main properties of the differentially-private decision tree algorithms.
Classifier
Budget
per
Query
Tree
Type
Tree
Depth d
Forest
Size τ
Handles
Cont.
Attributes
Prediction
Accuracy
Blum, Dwork,
McSherry &
Nissim (2005)
β
2md−1
Greedy m 1 No Very Low1
Friedman &
Schuster (2010)
β
(2+n)d Greedy 5 1 Poorly Low
Mohammed,
Barouti,
Alhadidi & Chen
(2015)
β/d Greedy 4 1 No Medium1
Patil & Singh
(2014)
β
τ(2d−1) Greedy 5 20 No Very Low
Fletcher &
Islam (2015a)
β
τ(2d−1) Greedy 5 4 No Low
Rana, Gupta &
Venkatesh
(2016)
β/2d or
β/3d
Greedy Unspecified 500+ Yes High2
Jagannathan,
Pillaipakkam-
natt & Wright
(2012)
β/τ Random
Maximized
Diversity
(Discrete)
10 Yes Medium
Jagannathan,
Monteleoni &
Pillaipakkam-
natt(2013)
β/τ Random
Maximized
Diversity
(Discrete)
5 then
200
Yes High
Fletcher &
Islam (2015b)
β/τ Random Dynamic ≤ m No Medium
Fletcher &
Islam (2016)
β Random
Maximized
Diversity
100 Yes High
1 Our best estimation; the authors did not empirically test the algorithm.
2 With a weaker definition of differential privacy.
way for ensembles of greedy trees to perform well; currently 20 or even less greedy
trees divides the privacy budget too much to be useful [Fletcher and Islam 2015a;
Patil and Singh 2014].
The optimal depth of differentially-private greedy trees is another open question.
The depth of their random counterparts has been explored much more thoroughly, as
we can see in Section 3.4. This question becomes even more interesting when consider-
ing the cost of the queries in each non-leaf level of the tree; the deeper the tree grows,
the more the budget must be divided. This of course presupposes that there is not a
creative way of using disjoint data in each level of the tree; such a discovery would
open up a wealth of new possibilities.
Section 3.6 demonstrates that there is some amount of disagreement
about how many trees are needed in a differentially-private random for-
est. Jagannathan et al. [2012] claim that τ = 10 trees is enough to achieve
high accuracy, citing the findings of Fan et al. [2003] as evidence. Conversely
Fletcher and Islam [2016] found that on the order of 100 trees was preferable,
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demonstrating their claim empirically. This matches more closely with the work of
Geurts et al. [2006], who used 100 to 1000 random trees. More research in this area
may elicit some heuristics for defining τ , or perhaps more rigorous mathematics for
finding the optimal τ .
Rana et al. [2016] explored weakening the definition of differential privacy, which
led to greatly improved results (discussed in Section 3.7). They proposed one strategy
for how to weaken the definition, but there is no reason to suspect that there are not
other possible definitions. The original privacy definition proposed by Dwork [2006]
has been thoroughly investigated and is mathematically rigorous (see Section 2.1), and
this high standard should be required of any competing definition. Rana et al. [2016]’s
definition (and any future definitions) would thus require more research before they
can be considered true alternatives to the original definition when the privacy of real
people is at stake. If such an alternative was developed though, the improvements in
data mining quality could be substantial.
In Section 3.8 we discussed how small savings can be made with the privacy bud-
get by “cutting corners” where possible. While an elegant algorithm might require g
queries, heuristics can allow us to remove h unnecessary queries by either inferring
the results from the other g − h queries, or relying on data-independent estimates
where accurate results are not absolutely necessary. Increasing the budget per query
from ǫ = β/g to ǫ = β/(g − h) is likely worth any increases in algorithmic complex-
ity caused by adding additional steps or heuristics. As differentially-private decision
trees are further honed in the future, small improvements such as these will be key to
optimizing the results in the real world.
The final open area that catches our attention is the idea of spending unequal quan-
tities of the privacy budget on different queries. So far in the literature, all algorithms
have assumed that all g queries will use β/g of the budget, implicitly assuming that
all the queries are of equal importance to the success of the algorithm, or require
equal levels of accuracy to be useful. We suspect that some queries, however, can
achieve their purpose in the algorithmwith more added noise than other more “fragile”
queries. This would be an interesting idea to explore in the future.
6. PRIVATE DATA PUBLISHING WITH DECISION TREES
When differentially-privately querying a dataset, it is assumed that the data owner is
maintaining a server that allows users to submit queries. This scenario is an example
of what is sometimes called “privacy-preserving data mining” [Aggarwal and Yu 2008],
where data mining is applied directly to the original data using a private mecha-
nism. Sometimes maintaining a server is impractical, such as due to financial or lo-
gistical reasons, and the data owner would prefer to release a private version of the
data to the public. This scenario is an example of “privacy-preserving data publishing”
[Fung et al. 2010], where the data is kept as similar as possible to the original data
[Fletcher and Islam 2014] while still protecting privacy. While this survey focuses on
the construction of differentially-private decision trees, we take a moment to briefly
discuss the other side of the coin: how traditional, non-private decision trees can be
used to publish private data. This includes privacy-preservation strategies other than
differential privacy as well.
While differential privacy is becoming the de-facto standard for modern privacy
preservation [Clifton and Tassa 2013], other forms of privacy preservation exist. The
main competing approach is k-anonymity [Sweeney 2002], which uses the idea of “gen-
eralization”. In a privacy context the term “generalization” refers to making attribute
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values more “general”; that is, less granular.5 A classic example is to generalize birth
dates to birth years, or to generalize street addresses to suburbs. k-anonymity states
that every record in a dataset should have all the same values as at least k − 1 other
records in the dataset. Fung et al. proposed a practical implementation named “Top-
Down Specialization” [Fung et al. 2005; Fung et al. 2007] that achieves k-anonymity
by first making every value in the dataset as general as possible, and then building a
greedy decision tree that iteratively increases the granularity of attributes. Attributes
were selected to be made more granular (i.e., specialized) if they had high information
gain compared to the amount of privacy they leaked. In other words, k = N at the
root node, and then k is reduced with each split as efficiently as possible, terminating
when k reached the user-defined minimum. After the decision tree was built, a syn-
thetic k-anonymous dataset could be released that used the specializations chosen by
the tree.
Interestingly, Top-Down Specialization was re-purposed in 2011
[Mohammed et al. 2011] to provide differential privacy instead of k-anonymity.
Instead of specializing attributes based on their utility-privacy trade-off (in the
node splitting function), only utility is considered. The resulting tree is then used
to create segments of generalized records, whose frequency can be differentially-
privately outputted. Thus a frequency table of generalized records can be released.
The reasoning for this approach was that generalization offers something that adding
Laplace noise does not; values in the dataset cannot be outright incorrect, merely less
granular. In scenarios where misleading information must be avoided at all costs, this
approach can be very appropriate. When building a non-private decision tree from
the generalized data, the prediction accuracy was similar to the accuracy achieved by
Friedman and Schuster’s algorithm [Friedman and Schuster 2010].
Another type of privacy preservation is noise addition, in which noise is selectively
added to attribute values to hide sensitive information [Agrawal and Srikant 2000].
Several privacy-preserving decision tree algorithms have been proposed that add noise
in such a way that the original patterns found by the decision trees are preserved
in the anonymized data [Islam and Brankovic 2011; Fletcher and Islam 2015c]. Noise
addition offers less rigorous protection of people’s privacy than k-anonymity however,
and neither technique offers mathematical guarantees like differential privacy. Per-
haps most egregiously, they provide no protections against malicious users who have
supplementary information (information from other sources about the people in the
dataset). Without clearly definable guarantees for each individual, it is difficult for
noise addition or k-anonymity to be implemented in a way that meets the real-world
privacy policy requirements of governments and businesses. A detailed comparison of
the advantages and disadvantages between k-anonymity and differential privacy was
performed by Clifton and Tassa in 2013 [Clifton and Tassa 2013].
Mivule et al. [2012] also proposed a framework that iteratively checks the
quality of a differentially-private dataset with an AdaBoost decision forest
[Freund and Schapire 1999], updating the dataset until the forest achieves acceptable
prediction accuracy. Their framework lacked detail however, and their results were
mixed.
Many other techniques have been proposed for publishing differentially-private
data, though not with decision trees and therefore outside the scope of this work.
They often involve partitioning the original dataset in a way that balances utility
with privacy, then creating aggregated records from noisy histograms of the parti-
tions [Blum et al. 2013; Li et al. 2014]. The utility of these techniques suffers exponen-
5Not to be confused with the definition of “generalization” that describes a classifier’s ability to generalize
to unseen data.
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tially when the number of attributes increases beyond four, making them unusable in
most real-world scenarios (barring an equally exponential increase in the number of
records). We refer the reader to Ji et al.’s survey [Ji et al. 2014] for more details.
7. CHOOSING THE PRIVACY BUDGET
In all of the algorithms talked about in this survey, the privacy parameter ǫ determines
how much noise is added to the output of queries. This extends to all applications of
differential privacy; ǫ is at the core of its definition. Despite this, very little work has
been done in how to choose an appropriate value for ǫ in the real world, both for ensur-
ing comparable utility between private and non-private queries, and for providing an
appropriate amount of privacy protection to each of the individuals in the data. Dwork
et al. themselves have left these questions up to the discretion of the user and their
particular needs [Dwork and Roth 2013]. To the best of our knowledge, two papers
have provided practical guidelines for choosing ǫ; one from the perspective of utility
[Vu and Slavkovic 2009] and one from the perspective of privacy [Hsu et al. 2014].
Using the context of clinical trials, Vu and Slavkovic [2009] provided several results
in 2009 for how to use hypothesis testing in a scenario where sensitive information
needs protecting. They focus on the sample size of the test, and demonstrate howmany
more records are needed to produce the same quality of results that the test would
produce if privacy was not a concern. The authors do so in terms of two main factors:
the confidence level of the hypothesis test (type I error) and the power of the hypothesis
test (type II error). The equations for this scaling of the number of records, dubbed the
“sample size correction factor”, can be found in Vu and Slavkovic [2009]. If a user is
able to estimate how many samples they would need to achieve strong results for their
hypothesis test, they can use Vu and Slavkovic’s work to achieve the same results, but
differentially-privately.
On the other side of the utility-privacy trade-off, Hsu et al. [2014] proposed the first
practical methodology for deciding how small ǫ needs to be to appropriately protect
people’s privacy for a given scenario. They do so by modeling the problem in terms of
money; the monetary budget of the user collecting or using the sensitive data. In any
given scenario, each individual included in the data is at a certain amount of risk. By
estimating the probability of an individual’s privacy being maliciously breached, and
the monetary cost associated with that breach, the user can calculate the average risk
per individual in the data. Since the probability of a breach is directly tied to ǫ (i.e.,
the presence of a record can change the output with probability proportional to exp(ǫ),
see Theorem 2.1), the user can balance how many samples they collect/use, how large
ǫ can realistically be, and how much money they are willing to spend (either on paying
people to participate in the study or on compensating the individuals whose privacy is
breached). Such a model offers practical guidelines for how large or small the privacy
budget can realistically be.
8. CONCLUSION
When sensitive data – data that risks the privacy of the people it describes – needs to
be data mined, decision trees lend themselves well to the strict requirements of differ-
ential privacy. We have surveyed the current literature of differentially-private deci-
sion trees, breaking down the state-of-the-art algorithms into their constituent parts.
Termination criteria, pruning strategies, building an ensemble of trees, greedy heuris-
tics in non-leaf nodes, and querying the labels in leaf nodes are some of the factors
that must be considered when making a high-performing decision tree algorithm. We
explored each of these factors in turn, as well as others. We compared and contrasted
the design decisions made by the authors, evaluating their effectiveness at discovering
predictive knowledge from sensitive data.
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One theme that re-occurred throughout our discussion was the ever-present conflict
between privacy and utility. Whenever the sensitive data is queried, there is a cost
associated, and that cost needs to be weighed against the benefits. Those benefits de-
pend on the aim of the algorithm; is it aiming to discover knowledge, build a model
with high prediction accuracy, both, or something else? These aims each lend them-
selves to slightly different strategies, changing the cost-benefit analysis that the user
makes when deciding when their algorithm should query the data. Depending on how
a query is asked, its sensitivity can also change drastically. As we saw in Section 3.3.1,
even changing a query slightly from “what are the class counts in this leaf node?” to
“what is the majority class label in this leaf node?” allows for a much less noisy answer
to be outputted.
Balancing the requirements of differential privacy with a decision tree algorithm
that optimizes utility is a delicate process, and one that should be done with great
care. It is our hope that the reader has gained a thorough understanding of the nuances
involved in designing a differentially-private decision tree algorithm, and we eagerly
await the progress that the future holds.
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